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Article 8

Commentary on Adrian Cronauer's
"The Fairness Doctrine"
Robert P. Rhodes*
Does the invocation of the Fairness Doctrine chill speech and inhibit
controversial, provocative public affairs programming? Might not the
doctrine provide access to victims of outrageous treatment by local media,
but whose ill treatment falls short of libel standards? I am in substantial
agreement with Adrian Cronauer's position that the doctrine is not in the
public interest and raises serious First Amendment questions. The federal
courts wisely have never pronounced the doctrine violative of the First
Amendment, following the traditional principle not to pass on a constitutional question if there is some other ground on which a case can be
resolved.' The resolution of constitutional issues should not be the
exclusive preoccupation of the courts, particularly when they turn on
empirical conclusions which fact-finding bodies are better equipped to
determine. For now the decision to resuscitate or not is better left to the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC or the Commission) and
Congress.
Although the doctrine is moribund today, Adrian Cronauer's analysis
has important implications for the right of free speech and press for the
future of the communications industry. He points out that the printed
medium, which has always had First Amendment protection from the
Fairness Doctrine, does not need to be regulated to ensure varying views
or response by those individuals whose integrity has been attacked.' Libel
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1. See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). The D.C. Circuit found neither capricious nor arbitrary the
FCC's decision to abandon the Fairness Doctrine because it was not in the public interest
and probably violative of the First Amendment. Id. at 665.
2. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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law is sufficient protection for the latter. Cronauer's view is that broadcasting is not different from the printed press, and it should have the same
constitutional protection. Nor is broadcasting more influential or pervasive
than other media which do not have a Fairness Doctrine, including videos
and films.
Cronauer's analysis is especially strong when it puts to rest the
"scarcity of the spectrum" argument. His challenge to assumed linkages
between multiple licensing for broadcasters and diverse views is particularly sound. Cronauer clearly demonstrates that those who support the Fairness
Doctrine, such as those who supported the Red Lion holding, are mistaken
in assuming that broadcasters who compete for licenses naturally have a
diversity of views on public affairs.3 The truth is that station owners are
interested in obtaining licenses to make money by pleasing viewers, not to
offer alternative views of public affairs. Natural limits on the spectrum are
limits on players in the broadcasting market, not restrictions on alternative
views. Public-affairs programming is market driven just like all other
programming. Cronauer's analysis also demonstrates that "narrowcasting"
and the multiplication of cable and satellite technology have rendered the
scarcity argument meaningless and obsolete.
Most importantly, Cronauer argues that the Fairness Doctrine
discourages, rather than encourages, imaginative, informative programming
where minority views are aired, because it enhances the possibility that the
Fairness Doctrine might be invoked by those who disagree with the
program. Since that will require broadcasters to absorb costs for litigation
and loss of commercial time to show alternative views, the pragmatic
strategy for a broadcast manager is to avoid controversial views. For
several of these reasons the FCC abolished the doctrine in 1987. In
abolishing the Fairness Doctrine, the FCC relied upon the Supreme Court's
indication that it would reassess its past support of the Fairness Doctrine
on its basis of the outdated notion of spectrum limitations.5
I would like to expand on Mr. Cronauer's criticism of the Supreme
Court's holding in Red Lion. The Court stated, "It is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."6 The rhetoric of "rights" raises problems that are deeper than

3. Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
4. In Re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council against Television Station WTVH
Syracuse, N.Y., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, para. 98 (1987),
recons. denied, 3 FCC Rcd. 2035, para. 6 (1988), afj'd sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council
v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
5. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376-77 n.11, 378 n.12 (1984).
6. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
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those suggested by Mr. Cronauer. Other Supreme Court holdings employ
this rhetoric. In CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, the
Democratic National Committee had requested a declaratory ruling from the
FCC that either the Federal Communications Act of 1934 or the First
Amendment required CBS to sell advertising time to groups wishing to
present views on public issues.7 In this 1973 case, as in the late 1940s, the
FCC argued that the Fairness Doctrine represented the "right of the public
to be informed, rather than any right on the part of the Government, any
broadcast licensee or any individual member of the public to broadcast his
own particular views on any matter."'
In ordinary discourse, we frequently speak of balancing "rights" when
we mean merely balancing values. We may balance the right of the
community to be free from fear of crime with the right of criminals to due
process. But when ordinary meanings are substituted for serious legal
analysis, considerable confusion occurs. There has been a rhetorical use of
"rights" language among legal scholars, journalists, and philosophers for the
last several decades that leads to incoherence when applied to morality and
law. The incoherence carries over to discussion of the Fairness Doctrine.
A coherent right requires someone else as a matter of legal or moral
obligation to enforce the right. It demands specificity and some operationalized remedy. Municipalities have rights, groups have rights in class action
suits, individual stations and networks have rights, and individuals
aggrieved by libel and slander have rights. But communities cannot have
rights; indeed, the notion of an abstract right of the public is incoherent as
a matter of law. The general public cannot have a "right to be informed."
There is no right of the public to know. There is no right to health care.
These are not simply wrong statements; they are incoherent statements.
Such rhetoric is viscerally appealing given a political culture of rights
language, but causes substantial mischief when we assess law and policy.
Defining the "public interest," as Mr. Cronauer points out so well, is
a business varnished with special pleading in the history of the Fairness
Doctrine. Mr. Cronauer sees the public interest better satisfied by the free
market, rather than with rhetorical appeals to the right of the public over
that of broadcasters. That is because it is really individuals with idiosyncratic views, and not an abstract "general public," that contends for the
right to have their views expressed under the Fairness Doctrine. It was,
after all, Fred Cook and his views, and not the views of general public, that

7. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
8. Id. at 112-13 (citing In re Editorializing by Brdcst. Licensees, Report of the
Commission, 13 F.C.C. 1246, para. 6 (1949)).

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

were defended in Red Lion.9 I certainly agree with Mr. Cronauer's
conclusion that this chills First Amendment rights of broadcasters to free
speech and press.
I do, however, disagree with Mr. Cronauer's philosophical justification
for free speech and press. Mr. Cronauer assumes that an "invisible hand"
of market forces should define the public interest, and cites that unfortunate
metaphor, the marketplace of ideas. The sentence from Justice Holmes from
which the familiar metaphor comes is as follows.
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out.'0
While I have confidence that the free market will better protect
fairness in public-affairs programming than will government applications
of the Fairness Doctrine, it is another matter to argue that economic success
is an acceptable criteria for evaluating good journalism and good programming in public affairs. Both Holmes and Cronauer are wrong on this score.
The political test of ideas for public policy is indeed a competition
analogous to the marketplace, namely, elections where votes are competed
for and candidates are marketed. Ideas and images are "products" of the
communications market. But it is quite another matter to say that what is
acceptable in the marketplace ought to be the criteria of what is ultimately
good in journalism, programming, or any other human endeavor.
If the public interest is defined by which ideas "win" (that is which
ideas generate acceptance based on viewership or readership of media), the
argument from the marketplace to a public interest would justify slavery in
the early nineteenth century, medical fraud at the turn of the century, and
pederasty on the Internet today. Political liberties such as free speech and
press deserve better arguments than that.
The purpose of free speech and press, in my view, is to provide
protection for autonomous communication so that citizens can decide what
the public interest is. Of course, we do not agree on what the public
interest is; that is why we have a system of politics. That political system
is an ongoing process. The Fairness Doctrine was an attempt to protect

9. Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Pennsylvania radio station WCCB, owned by Red
Lion, aired a broadcast which made disparaging remarks against Fred Cook for his book
Goldwater-Extremist on the Right. Id. at 371.

10. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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forums for public discussion in broadcasting. But it was an unnecessary and
clumsy attempt that too easily crossed the line and chilled the content of
the forum in a manner prohibited by the First Amendment. The choice of
what should be broadcast about public affairs under the Fairness Doctrine
reflected a specific government's understanding of the public interest that
tended to suppress dissenting ideas. That is why we are better off with the
free market in newscasting.
But we need not conclude from the above argument that the public
interest is better defined by the market, or that the government and the
media have no responsibility to separate the public interest from what sells.
There is a normative consideration that transcends the law. The criteria for
good journalism ought not be a market criteria any more than the
parameters of public interest and social justice ought to be dispositively
defined by electoral success. Ethics and character in journalism matter.
Traditional news has been transformed to a market-driven entertainment
industry. The proliferation of cable TV and "narrowcasting" has produced
a political culture of segmented sensationalism where good journalism
currently has very little institutional support. Congress can, and has,
prohibited commercial advertising for cigarettes, snuff, and little cigars
when it frames the public interest in the field of health." Government has
an important responsibility to shape citizen understanding of public affairs
in other fields as well. To be neutral would be to abdicate a leadership role
in identifying and pursuing the public's interests. How government will go
about fulfilling that role in the coming communication revolution is
problematical. But Cronauer has adroitly made clear that the Fairness
Doctrine is an anachronism past its time, if it ever had a legitimate time,
because it does not protect free speech or facilitate public dialogue.

11. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988).

